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ABSTRACT. This paper examines how Foucault and Deleuze understand each other’s work, ar-
guing that they are united in their common endeavour to make it possible to think again. Focusing 
on Foucault’s ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ and Deleuze’s Foucault, it shows how each of Foucault 
and Deleuze considers the other as someone who opens anew the possibility of thinking. The first 
section examines Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault’s work. It demonstrates that, despite sound-
ing as if he is elucidating his own philosophy, Deleuze is correct in saying that Foucault re-thinks 
thought by positing the disjunction between the articulable and the visible, among other things. 
Turning to Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s works, the second section explains why Foucault deems 
Deleuze’s notion of thought as a disjunctive affirmation. By underscoring the disjunctive role ‘and’ 
plays in the disjunctive affirmation of ‘the event and the phantasm’ and/or of thought itself and its 
object, Foucault considers Deleuze as someone who re-thinks thought not by conceptualising it 
but by thinking difference. The paper concludes that, while each endeavours to consider thought 
in a new light, both Foucault and Deleuze believe that the other makes it possible to think again. 
Keywords: Foucault; Deleuze; audio-visual disjunction; disjunctive affirmation; thinking differ-
ence; thought 
INTRODUCTION 
In ‘Intellectuals and Power’, the 1972 dialogue between Michel Foucault and Gilles 
Deleuze, the latter asserts that both he and Foucault seek to undermine what may be re-
ferred to as ‘representative mind’. Deleuze remarks: ‘A theorising intellectual, for us, is 
no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness’.1 Agreeing with 
Deleuze, Foucault replies, saying that it is not the intellectual’s task ‘to express the stifled 
truth of the collectivity’.2 This means that an intellectual may serve only as a mouthpiece 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel Foucault 
and Gilles Deleuze” [1972], in Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald 
Bouchard (1996), 206. 
2 Ibid., 207-208. 
WENDYL LUNA 
 
Foucault Studies, No. 27, 47-67.    49  
 
through which the person he represents (e.g., the so-called delinquent, mad, and so on) 
finds a voice. Lawlor and Sholtz explain that, for Foucault and Deleuze, an intellectual 
does not speak on behalf of those he represents but rather amplifies and resounds their 
voices.3 How Foucault and Deleuze problematise representation, the role of the intellec-
tual or what it means to represent another person, certainly needs to be unpacked. Nev-
ertheless, what is clear in this dialogue is that both of them put into question this repre-
sentative mind precisely because it epitomizes identity thinking—a totalitarian form of 
thought which, by identifying oneself with another, ironically eradicates their identity. 
Against representational or identity thinking, Foucault and Deleuze advocate non-repre-
sentational and difference thinking, paving the way for a reconstruction of thought. 
In this paper, I demonstrate that, despite their various ‘philosophical differences’,4 Fou-
cault and Deleuze have at least one important thing in common: both strive to make it 
possible to think again. I argue that this is an important similarity between the two that is 
worthy of careful attention and study. There are various ways in which the question of 
how Foucault and Deleuze make thinking possible again could be addressed. One way 
would be to consider separately each of their methods of re-thinking thought and then 
identify the common means by which they open up the possibility of thinking. Another 
is to look at how Foucault and Deleuze each consider the other as one who makes thinking 
possible again. I will focus on the latter way not only because space is limited but also 
because it is more interesting and illuminating to examine how Foucault and Deleuze un-
derstand each other. More importantly, although a few scholars have considered the sim-
ilarity between the two,5 as far as I am aware, nobody has examined how they respectively 
understand each other on the question of thinking.6 Conversely, various scholars empha-
sise the differences between them, but while these are laudable for assisting our under-
standing of Foucault’s and Deleuze’s often contrasting views, they nonetheless tend to 
overlook, if not obscure, their similar standpoints.  
 
3 Leonard Lawlor and Janae Sholtz, “Speaking Out For Others: Philosophy’s Activity in Deleuze and Fou-
cault (and Heidegger),” in Between Deleuze and Foucault, ed. Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel W. Smith 
(2016), 152. 
4 See, for instance, Wendy Grace, “Faux Amis: Foucault and Deleuze on Sexuality and Desire,” Critical Inquiry 
36:1 (2009); Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail, and Daniel W. Smith,  “Introduction,” Foucault Studies 17 (2014); 
and, Paul Patton, “Activism, Philosophy and Actuality in Deleuze and Foucault,” Deleuze Studies 4 (2010). 
5 For example, Nicolae Morar and Marjorie Gracieuse, “Against the Incompatibility Thesis: A rather Different 
Reading of the Desire-Pleasure Problem,” in Between Deleuze and Foucault, ed. Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail 
and Daniel W. Smith (2016). 
6 Similar to Morar and Gracieuse, Kevin Thompson asserts that there is a similarity between Foucault and 
Deleuze. He explains how Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism enables Foucault to develop his own gene-
alogical method, among others (Kevin Thompson, “Foucault and the ‘Image of Thought’: Archaeology, Ge-
nealogy, and the Impetus of Transcendental Empiricism,” in Between Deleuze and Foucault, ed. Nicolae Morar, 
Thomas Nail and Daniel W. Smith [2016], 200). Interestingly enough, towards the end of his paper, he re-
marks that, while Foucault and Deleuze have diverging views on ‘what compels us to think’, nonetheless 
Heidegger’s Was heißt Denken? ‘lurks behind the work of each figure during this formative period’, being 
‘one of the points of convergence in [the Foucault-Deleuze] encounter’ (ibid., 209). While it would be fruitful 
to investigate how Heidegger’s notion of thinking influences Foucault’s and Deleuze’s views on the subject, 
it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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By highlighting Foucault and Deleuze’s shared commitment to make thinking possible 
again, I seek to address a paucity in Foucault and Deleuze scholarship as well as illumine 
what it means to think difference. Simply highlighting the differences between thinkers 
(or things, for that matter) is not enough to undertake difference-thinking but, following 
Foucault, it is necessary to affirm them disjunctively. To unpack how the two re-think 
thought, in the first section, ‘Foucault’s problematization of thought’, I begin by examin-
ing how Foucault, to Deleuze, makes it possible to think again. Deleuze asserts that Fou-
cault opens up the possibility of thinking by problematizing thought, particularly by in-
vestigating the conditions of strata or historical formations. Likewise, as I will show in the 
next section, ‘Thinking as disjunctive affirmation’, Deleuze, for Foucault, opens up the 
possibility of thinking. For him, Deleuze re-thinks thought not by conceptualising it but 
by considering it as a ‘disjunctive affirmation’ of the event and the phantasm as well as of 
thought itself and its object. The paper concludes that, apart from making it possible to 
think again, both Foucault and Deleuze believe that the other seeks to open anew the pos-
sibility of thinking, an endeavour which each of them fully supports. Each of their sepa-
rate works individually contributes to re-thinking thought. Their analysis of each other’s 
work, then, reinforces their mutual pursuit. Let me now examine how Foucault, according 
to Deleuze, problematizes thought.  
FOUCAULT’S PROBLEMATIZATION OF THOUGHT: DELEUZE ON FOUCAULT 
From 1985-1986 at the University of Paris 8, Deleuze delivered a series of lectures on Fou-
cault. Transcriptions of the series are available online and an English translation is also 
underway.7 At the end of this series, in 1986, Deleuze published a book-summary entitled 
Foucault. According to a number of commentators, the book Foucault unfortunately does 
not do justice to Deleuze’s lectures in the sense that it does not fully reproduce the richness 
of the lectures.8 Despite the injustice done to the series of lectures, the book nonetheless 
contains a wealth of information concerning Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault. In this 
section on Deleuze, I will refer extensively to Deleuze’s book to explain how, for him, 
Foucault makes it possible to think again. According to Deleuze, Foucault’s problemati-
zation of thought, which he accomplishes by investigating knowledge, power and the self, 
is his way of opening up the possibility of re-thinking thought. 
One of Deleuze’s most important claims in Foucault is that ‘thought’ is the ‘one thing 
[that] haunts Foucault’.9 He goes on to say that Foucault’s history is not any history but ‘a 
history of thought as such’. ‘To think’, he continues, ‘means to experiment and to prob-
lematize. Knowledge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of 
 
7 Université de Paris 8, “La Voix de Gilles Deleuze en ligne” (2011); cf. Purdue University, “Course 
Transcriptions: Deleuze’s seminars on Foucault” (2018). 
8 For instance, Morar, Nail, and Smith write: ‘Some of these [ideas and concepts] eventually made their way 
into [Deleuze’s] book on Foucault but there are many analyses that find no parallel in his published book, 
Foucault. For this reason, some of the most innovative philosophical scholarship on Foucault can be found in 
these lectures’ (Morar, Nail, and Smith, “Introduction,” 5). 
9 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault [1986] (1999), 116. 
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thought’.10 I could not agree more with Deleuze on this point, subject to the qualification 
below. His assertion not only summarises his book but also captures Foucault’s project. I 
want to highlight Deleuze’s phrase, ‘Foucault’s history is a history of thought as such’ 
(phrase slightly modified).11 The description, ‘history of thought as such’, sounds some-
what exaggerated. While it is true that Foucault writes a history of thought, he would not 
claim that it is a history of thought as such. In fact, in his essay, ‘What is Enlightenment?’, 
he makes it clear that his investigations are localised or drawn from the specific context 
of the West.12 To speak of ‘history of thought as such’, therefore, may be slightly mislead-
ing on the basis that it is highly unlikely that Foucault would have wished his work to be 
categorised in this way and would not have thought of it that way himself.  
Despite being a little overstated, Deleuze’s phrase gives us insight into Foucault’s un-
dertaking. For, this is exactly how Foucault himself conceives of his work. Naming his 
chair at the Collège de France, ‘The History of Systems of Thought’, indicates that Fou-
cault considers his work as a history of thought. Even more importantly, how he conducts 
or substantiates his research through his chair is what makes it a history of thought itself. 
Therefore, exploring the way in which Foucault conducts his research is of interest to an-
yone who seeks to understand in what way Foucault is concerned with thought or in how 
he opens up the possibility of thinking. By exploring and reconstructing Foucault’s re-
search, Deleuze greatly helps in understanding the former’s project of writing a history of 
thought. As quoted above, he explains that the problematization of thought is anchored 
by Foucault’s threefold investigation of knowledge, power and the self. It would have 
been more instructive if we can explain how all the aspects of Foucault’s tripartite inves-
tigation together serve as the foundation for his problematization of thought. However, 
because space is limited, I can only discuss the first: the ‘anchor of knowledge’. Despite 
being the only anchor discussed, examination of the anchor of knowledge still clarifies 
how Foucault, for Deleuze, is not simply concerned with thought but really seeks to re-
think thought. More importantly, the discussion of this anchor is where the similarity be-
tween Foucault’s and Deleuze’s respective ways of re-thinking thought is most apparent. 
For, here, we can find Deleuze’s explanation of what he might call ‘audio-visual disjunc-
tion’, one that bears striking parallels with Foucault’s understanding of Deleuze’s notion 
of thought as disjunctive affirmation. Let me now examine how, according to Deleuze, 
Foucault’s problematization of thought is rooted in the anchor of knowledge. 
 
10 Ibid. 
11 Deleuze’s original statement reads as follows: ‘[Foucault] writes a history, but a history of thought as such’ 
(ibid.). 
12 Foucault writes: ‘Finally, these historico-critical investigations are quite specific in the sense that they al-
ways bear upon a material, an epoch, a body of determined practices and discourses. And yet, at least at the 
level of the Western societies from which we derive, they have their generality, in the sense that they have 
continued to recur up to our time’ (Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” [1984], in The Politics of Truth, 
ed. Sylvère Lotringer [2007], 117). 
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A. The anchor of knowledge 
Deleuze asserts that, in understanding Foucault, it is important to be always mindful of 
his theories of ‘visibility’ and ‘articulability’. Otherwise, explains Deleuze, if one ignores 
or fails to understand these theories, there is a danger of misrepresenting not only Fou-
cault’s peculiar understanding of history but also ‘his thought and his conception of 
thought in general’.13 For Deleuze, therefore, in order to capture Foucault’s thought as 
well as his notions of history and thought, it is necessary to pay attention to his theories 
of visibility and articulability. The important thing to highlight in Deleuze’s remark is the 
close connection between Foucault’s theories and his notions of history and thought. He 
would say that understanding this connection not only illumines what Foucault means 
by thought but also reveals how he makes it possible to think again. The question, then, 
is: how, according to Deleuze, does Foucault conceptualise these theories and how are 
they connected to his notions of history and thought?  
The first thing to note about the terms ‘visibility’ and ‘articulability’ is that they are not 
Foucault’s but Deleuze’s. Despite being Deleuzian, these terms are nonetheless apt to de-
scribe Foucault’s theories. That is to say, even if they are not Foucault’s terms, the way 
Deleuze describes them is consistent with how Foucault conceptualises them. To answer 
the question of how Foucault conceptualises articulability and visibility as well as how 
they are connected to his notions of history and thought, he discusses Foucault’s idea of 
stratum or historical formation. He writes: ‘Each historical formation sees and reveals all 
it can within the conditions laid down for visibility, just as it says all it can within the 
conditions relating to statements’.14 In other words, each stratum or historical formation, 
what Foucault calls ‘episteme’, is conditioned by the conditions of visibility and articula-
bility. The latter conditions, then, make it possible for any historical formation to emerge. 
In explaining the conditions of articulability or the statement, there are at least three things 
that need to be considered: 1) what Deleuze might call the ‘unconcealment’ of statements 
(i.e., they are not hidden); 2) the displacement of the subject; and, 3) the specificity and 
finitude of a corpus of words and texts and/or of phrases and propositions.15 The thing 
Deleuze wants to emphasise here is the specificity or historicity of these conditions, 
namely, that they are embedded in history, even though they serve as conditions for 
thought. For Deleuze, therefore, Foucault argues that the conditions of strata, historical 
formations or forms of knowledge (i.e., episteme) may not be sought outside of history 
but may be found therein.  
By emphasising the historicity of these conditions, Foucault, according to Deleuze, de-
parts significantly from Kant. It is precisely this deviating idea of what comprises a ‘con-
dition’ that marks Foucault’s point of departure from Kant. Whereas Kant posits the ex-
istence of conditions that ground possible experience, Foucault, claims Deleuze, posits that 
these ‘conditions are those of real experience (statements, for example, assume a limited 
 
13 Deleuze, Foucault, 50. 
14 Ibid., 59. 
15 Ibid., 53-57. 
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corpus)’.16 Again, here, Deleuze sounds as if he is explaining his own philosophy. For, as 
has been commonly and justifiably held, he posits the existence of conditions not of pos-
sible experience as it was for Kant but conditions of real experience. Despite sounding as 
if he is elucidating his own work, he is actually correct in describing Foucault as someone 
who, like him, posits conditions of real experience. For, Foucault himself argues for the 
oxymoronic notion of ‘historical a priori’. Elucidating this idea in his works such as The 
Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault explains that the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ for knowledge, power and forms of subjectivity, among others, may be sought 
not outside but within history itself.17 With his insistence on the historicity of these condi-
tions, Foucault is more aligned with Deleuze than Kant, even though he employs the lat-
ter’s ‘conditions of possibility’. Deleuze, then, is justified in saying that what Foucault 
actually describes are conditions of real experience, thereby transforming the Kantian 
transcendental/ahistorical critique into a historical one. 
Colin Koopman confirms Deleuze’s observation by elaborating how Foucault trans-
forms Kant’s transcendental/ahistorical critique into a historical or genealogical investi-
gation. Similar to Deleuze, who emphasises the differences between Kant’s critique and 
that of Foucault, Koopman argues that Foucault’s genealogical/historical critique is com-
patible but not identical with Kant’s transcendental/ahistorical critique. Compatible, ex-
plains Koopman, because, similar to Kant’s critique, Foucault’s critique also investigates 
the ‘conditions of possibility’ for, say, knowledge. Despite their compatibility, the two are 
not identical, argues Koopman, because of the way these conditions are constructed. 
Whereas in Kant these conditions are constructed ‘epistemologically’, in Foucault they are 
constructed ‘historically’.18 That is, Kant posits that what needs to be presupposed in order 
for experience to be possible are the pure and non-empirical conditions, namely, the syn-
thetic activities of the mind, which include the syntheses of sensibility, understanding 
and, ultimately, the transcendental unity of apperception. Foucault reverses this, arguing 
that the impure, empirical or the conditioned themselves are the condition, or that the so-
called ‘conditions’ are historically conditioned. That is to say, they are a conditioned con-
dition.  
In his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault shows how Kant’s notion of ‘homo 
criticus’ or ‘man as a critical being’ is actually a conditioned condition or that it is histori-
cally conditioned. Arguing for the historicity or temporality of this concept, he mines 
Kant’s works to determine the conditions that make possible the idea of homo criticus or 
the concept of the ‘transcendental subject’ itself.19 Uncovering these conditions is made 
 
16 Ibid., 60; my emphasis. 
17 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966] (1970), 158; and, The 
Archaeology of Knowedge [1969] (2002), 142-148. 
18 Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique. Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (2013), 113. 
19 Foucault explains: ‘[I]f an archaeology of the text were possible, would it not reveal the genesis of a “homo 
criticus”, the structure of which would be essentially different from the image of man that went before?’ 
(Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology [1961] (2008), 19-20; Foucault’s emphasis). He continues, 




Foucault Studies, No. 27, 47-67.  54  
 
possible by comparing Kant’s Anthropology to the following: his notes or Reflexionen; Col-
legentwürfe; pre-Critical texts; its contemporary anthropological texts such as Baum-
garten’s Psychologica empirica and Schmidt’s Empirische Psychologie; Kant’s correspond-
ences with Beck, Schütz and Hufeland; and, finally, Kant’s Critical works.20 All these com-
parisons are not only meant to show the major transformations of Kant’s Anthropology, the 
elements that remain constant and those that have been added to it, but, more im-
portantly, they are also meant to show that the idea of homo criticus is a conditioned con-
dition, accounting therefore for the temporality of this transcendental concept. One im-
portant implication of arguing for the temporality of conditions is the de-centring of the 
subject, particularly of Kant’s ‘I’ or ‘transcendental unity of apperception’, thereby paving 
the way for a shift in focus. ‘[T]he conditions’, explains Deleuze, ‘are on the side of the 
“object” and historical formation, not a universal subject (the a priori itself is historical)’.21 
Moreover, it paves the way for a reconstruction of these conditions. Koopman explains 
that the conditions are no longer epistemologically constructed as the ‘necessary limits’ of 
certain forms of cognition but are rather historically constructed as ‘contingent limits’ of 
certain forms of practices.22 Both Deleuze and Koopman would say, then, that Foucault 
reconceptualises Kantian critique and transforms it into one that is concerned not with 
necessary/universal/transcendent conditions but with contingent/historical/real ones.  
Deleuze’s idea that Foucault reconceptualises Kant’s critique is an important insight. 
Deleuze may even be the first commentator to identify this ‘neo-Kantianism’ in Foucault. 
Despite its importance and novelty, this is not a major breakthrough. What is more in-
sightful in Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault is his idea of the ‘disjunction’ between 
what we see and what we say: ‘There is a disjunction between speaking and seeing, be-
tween the visible and the articulable: “what we see never lies in what we say”’.23 Deleuze 
elucidates this disjunction by saying that ‘the audiovisual is disjunctive’ and that its best 
examples may be found in the cinema.24 By resorting to the audio-visual or cinema to 
explain this disjunction, Deleuze once more sounds as if he is explaining his own philos-
ophy. Despite this, his idea of ‘disjunction’ between the visible and the articulable is key 
to understanding how Foucault’s problematization of thought is anchored by an investi-
gation of the formation of strata or knowledges. Before explaining how Deleuze’s idea of 
audio-visual disjunction illumines Foucault’s investigation of knowledge and, ultimately, 
of the latter’s problematization of thought, it is worth noting that we find more or less the 
same idea in Foucault. As I briefly mentioned in the introduction above and will elaborate 
later, Foucault describes Deleuze’s notion of thinking as a disjunctive affirmation of the 
event and the phantasm and/or of thought and its object. The similarity between Fou-
cault’s and Deleuze’s notions of ‘disjunction’ is striking. I will explain this in more detail 
below, but, for now, I would like to stress the importance of Deleuze’s idea of audio-visual 
 
20 Ibid., 20-22 & 23-51. 
21 Foucault, 60. 
22 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 113. 
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disjunction. Not only does it illumine Foucault’s problematization of thought but, more 
importantly, it also demonstrates the similarity, or, better yet, the disjunctive affirmation, 
between Foucault and Deleuze in relation to the reawakening of thought. 
B. The audio-visual disjunction: ‘a blind word and a mute vision’ 
Deleuze describes the articulable and the visible in at least three ways. First and foremost, 
they comprise strata or historical formations. Deleuze explains that strata or historical for-
mations are ‘sedimentary beds…made from things and words, from seeing and speaking, 
from the visible and the sayable…from contents and expressions’.25 In other words, the 
articulable and the visible are the basic units of any stratum. Without them, there would 
be no stratum or historical formation. Deleuze is correct in saying this because, in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault explains that statements are the building blocks not 
only of language but even of thought (of a certain age) itself: ‘If there were no statements, 
the language (langue) would not exist; but no statement is indispensable for a language to 
exist’.26 This brings us to Deleuze’s second characterisation of both the articulable and the 
visible, namely, they are the conditions that make possible the emergence of the particular 
form of thought of a certain age. He writes: ‘Speaking and seeing, or rather statements 
and visibilities, are pure Elements, a priori conditions under which all ideas are formulated 
and behaviour displayed, at some moment or other’.27 This means that the viewpoint of a 
certain age, or the way it sees and says practically about anything, is shaped by visibilities 
and statements. Deleuze is again correct in saying this because, in The Order of Things, for 
example, Foucault argues that Modernity has its own way of seeing, saying or ordering 
things, which can be distinguished from the Renaissance, the Classical Age or, perhaps, 
our own time.  
However, the question about how to determine with precision the particular form of 
thought of a certain age remains. This is where Deleuze is most instructive. He says, and 
this is his final and most important characterisation of the articulable and the visible, that 
it can be accomplished through differentiation or by considering them as disjunctive. Ef-
fectively, what Deleuze is saying is that the articulable and the visible together constitute 
strata, historical formations, knowledge or thought itself precisely by virtue of their dis-
junction. So, what does Deleuze mean by saying that the articulable and the visible are 
disjunctive? Before we can answer this question, we need to clarify what he means by the 
‘articulable’ or the ‘visible’. What Deleuze refers to as the ‘articulable’ are statements. He 
explains that they are opened up or extracted ‘from words, phrases or propositions’.28 
Although statements are extracted from the latter, they still need to be distinguished from 
them. As such, Deleuze would say that it would be futile to engage in ‘any linguistic 
study’ that analyses the ‘signifier, word, phrase, proposition, or linguistic act’.29 Foucault 
 
25 Ibid., 47. 
26 Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 95-96; Foucault’s emphasis. 
27 Foucault, 60; Deleuze’s emphasis. 
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would agree with Deleuze on this point. As he explains in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
statements cannot be analysed using logic, grammar, or speech-act theory as they are not 
propositions, sentences, or speech-acts.30 They are subject, instead, to archaeology, which, 
explains Foucault, is concerned with a regularity among objects, types of statement, con-
cepts, or thematic choices.31 Deleuze interprets this to mean that it is archaeology that un-
covers what he calls ‘a true form of expression’, namely, the articulable or statement.32 The 
articulable, therefore, is for Deleuze a form of expression.  
Inasmuch as statements are opened up and extracted from words or propositions, vis-
ibilities, asserts Deleuze, are also extracted ‘from things and sight’.33 He explains that Fou-
cault’s notion of ‘visible’ has nothing to do with the visible or perceptible elements (e.g., 
qualities, things or objects). Neither are they forms of objects nor illumined forms, but are 
rather ‘forms of luminosity…created by the light itself and allow a thing or object to exist 
only as a flash, sparkle or shimmer’.34 Whereas the articulable is a form of expression, the 
visible is for Deleuze a form of content.35 Penal law and medicine as forms of expression 
determine anything that can be articulated about delinquency and madness, respectively, 
while the prison and asylum as forms of content determine what can be seen or displayed, 
namely, the delinquent and the mad. Such a description is Deleuzian at its finest: ‘We 
borrow these last terms [i.e., content and expression] from Hjelmslev, but apply them to 
Foucault in a completely different way’.36 They are applied differently to Foucault because 
expression and content are not simply signifier and signified. Rather, as conditions of 
strata or historical formations, they determine what a particular age can say and/or see. 
Although he would agree with Deleuze on a number of points discussed above, Fou-
cault might find unusual Deleuze’s way of explaining visibilities. In the first place, to ex-
plain Foucault’s notion of ‘visible’, and more generally his archaeology, Deleuze gives 
examples from Foucault’s non-archaeological works, such as Death and the Labyrinth, Dis-
cipline and Punish, and The History of Sexuality, vol. 1.37 It is reasonably common knowledge 
that these works are considered to be genealogical rather than archaeological. As such, 
Deleuze’s examples taken from these genealogical works appear somewhat to be misap-
plications or misappropriations. However, Deleuze can reply, saying that the division of 
Foucault’s philosophy into archaeological, genealogical and ethical phases is arbitrary. He 
could assert that this division, while not necessarily stupid or silly because it structures 
Foucault’s sophisticated corpus, nonetheless keeps us from seeing the interconnectedness 
among the various elements of the Foucauldian oeuvre. One can even make a case, 
Deleuze could say, that Foucault undertakes archaeology even in his last published book, 
 
30 Archaeology of Knowledge, 91-94. 
31 Ibid., 41. 
32 Foucault, 52. 
33 Ibid., 53. 
34 Ibid., 52. 
35 Ibid., 47 & 52. 
36 Ibid., 47. 
37 Michel Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth. The World of Raymond Roussel [1963] (2004); Discipline and Punish 
[1975] (1995); and, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality, vol. 1 [1976] (2008). 
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The Care of the Self, by isolating the regularity of certain principles that organises or deter-
mines what he refers to as the ‘culture of self’ or ‘ethics of the subject’.38 However, taking 
examples from Foucault’s genealogical works to explain his archaeology is the least unu-
sual.  
Second, and even more unusual than the genealogical samples of archaeology, is 
Deleuze’s method of extraction by which statements or visibilities are said to be drawn 
from words/propositions or things/sight, respectively. This method is problematic for two 
reasons. First, it suggests that statements or visibilities are buried ‘underneath’ words or 
things, lying in wait for an archaeologist to uncover or break them open. This is contrary 
to Foucault’s archaeological method. He asserts that archaeology does not uncover ‘hid-
den’ meanings, much less is it concerned with meaning per se as it is not hermeneutics.39 
Instead, it finds relations among texts, while accounting for ‘discontinuities’. The second 
problem is that there is nothing in Foucault’s archaeology that suggests that statements 
are extracted from words or things. To reiterate, it seeks to describe a regularity and/or 
find relations among texts and not uncover the meanings they purportedly hide. The 
problem, then, with Deleuze’s method of extraction is that, while it is inexistent in Fou-
cault’s archaeology, it also seems to misapply the way the methodology is undertaken. In 
response, Deleuze can assert that, in saying that statements or visibilities can be extracted 
from words and things, he does not mean that archaeology uncovers hidden meanings. 
Alluding to the curtain hiding ‘nothing either behind or beneath it’, he explains that, even 
if they are never hidden, statements to a certain extent lie ‘underneath’ because they are 
not as obvious as they seem.40 As they are somewhat hidden, we should know how to 
read them. Therefore, the best, most important, and the only thing that we can do, accord-
ing to Deleuze, is to ‘describe the curtain’.  
The final and most unusual facet of Deleuze’s explanation of Foucauldian archaeology 
is his assertion that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive. Despite being the most 
controversial explanation, it is nonetheless the most important, not only because this is 
where his similarity with Foucault is most apparent, but also, and more importantly, be-
cause it clearly illustrates how, for Deleuze, Foucault re-opens the possibility of thinking. 
By saying that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive, Deleuze claims that Foucault 
thinks through their difference (better yet, thinks difference), emphasising that they are 
the same and at the same time different. On the one hand, they are the same, first because, 
as we have seen, while not hidden, they are not easily readable (in the case of statements) 
or visible (visibilities). Second, the two together serve as conditions of strata or historical 
formations, which means that both have to be present for a stratum to be formed. Finally, 
inseparable from a ‘particular mode’, they are specific to a certain age, enabling it to say 
words and see things the way it does. On the other hand, they are different from each 
 
38 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self. The History of Sexuality, vol. 3 [1984] (1988), 16. 
39 On Foucault’s archaeological-genealogical methodology going beyond hermeneutics, see Hubert Dreyfus 
and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (1983). 
40 Deleuze explains: ‘[T]he statement does remain hidden, but only if we do not rise to its extractive condi-
tions; on the contrary, it is there and says everything as soon as we reach these conditions’ (Foucault, 54). 
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other because they each have their own conditions that make them precisely what they 
are. Whereas ‘language-being’, on the one hand, makes statements articulable, ‘light-be-
ing’, on the other, ‘makes visibilities visible or perceptible’.41 
At first sight, Deleuze’s description of these conditions as the ‘being’ of the articulable 
and the visible may appear strange to Foucault. Even though he correctly points out two 
main differences between Foucault and Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty (e.g., Foucault’s 
‘light-being’ is historical, whereas Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s is phenomenologi-
cal),42 Deleuze seems to resort to Metaphysics, a move which Foucault would never be 
happy about. Worse, Deleuze seems to remove the conditions (i.e., statements and visibil-
ities) further away from what they condition (i.e., strata or historical formations). The lat-
ter, then, appear somewhat twice removed from their ‘ultimate’ condition, making it look 
as if Foucault searches for conditions outside of strata or historical formations. If this is 
what Deleuze means, then he is mistaken because, as we have seen, Foucault does not 
search for transcendental or ahistorical conditions but for contingent or historical ones. 
Moreover, in his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, Foucault makes it clear that what he 
is interested in is not the ‘origin’ that perpetually retreats but the ‘originary’ or ‘already 
there’. For Foucault, uncovering the ‘already there’ is the distinguishing feature of the true 
and proper anthropology (i.e., ‘pragmatic anthropology’), which, unlike the false one (i.e., 
‘non-pragmatic anthropology’), does not go beyond time or history.43 
In response, Deleuze can assert that, in saying that language-being and light-being are 
conditions of statements and visibilities, respectively, he does not mean that they are out-
side of strata or historical formations. He refers to them instead as forms of ‘exteriority’ 
that, contrary to being external, lie at the fringes of statements and visibilities.44 While 
separating statements and visibilities from each other, language-being and light-being are 
at the same time the common limit that connects them. Deleuze elaborates that these limit-
conditions are the two sides of the same coin: ‘a blind word and a mute vision’.45 They are 
responsible for maintaining ‘the heterogeneity of the two forms [i.e., the visible and the 
articulable], their difference in nature or anisomorphism’.46 On account of the twofold 
function of these limit-conditions, therefore, the articulable and the visible are said to be 
disjunctive.  
From the foregoing, it is now easy to see how, for Deleuze, Foucault opens up the pos-
sibility of re-thinking thought. According to Deleuze, Foucault makes it possible to think 
again precisely by thinking difference, in particular by thinking through the anisomor-
phism or disjunction between the articulable and the visible. By examining Deleuze’s 
claims in Foucault, particularly in the chapter on ‘Strata or Historical Formations’, I have 
shown that, even if he sounds as if he is explaining his own philosophy, Deleuze is justi-
fied with his interpretation of Foucault. From what Deleuze says about Foucault, 
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42 Ibid., 59. 
43 Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 64. 
44 Foucault, 66. 
45 Ibid., 65. 
46 Ibid., 67. 
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particularly his discussion of how, according to Foucault, strata or knowledges are 
formed, we gather that, for Deleuze, Foucault is concerned with thought as elaborated 
above in the context of the anchor of knowledge and the disjunction between articulability 
and visibility. I would like to discuss now what Foucault says about Deleuze in the context 
of re-thinking thought. 
THINKING AS DISJUNCTIVE AFFIRMATION: FOUCAULT ON DELEUZE 
In ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, Foucault not only reviews or explicates two of Deleuze’s 
major works, Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, but also praises Deleuze for 
‘establishing the thought of the event and the phantasm’.47 He asserts that ‘this century 
will be known as Deleuzian’,48 which may be constituted by undermining Platonism, 
among other things. Deleuze’s ‘reverse Platonism’ prioritises doxa to episteme and cele-
brates, for example, the spiteful Sophists, argumentative Stoics and crude Cynics. By de-
bunking Plato, Deleuze not only reprises the age-old dispute between Platonism and 
other ancient philosophical traditions – nor does he simply side with Plato’s critics. More 
importantly, Deleuze, for Foucault, is ‘a lightning storm’ through which ‘new thought is 
possible; thought is again possible’.49 This Deleuzian lightning storm, says Foucault, 
makes it possible for us ‘to think through the event and the phantasm’.50 I would like to 
highlight Foucault’s italicisation, and therefore intended emphasis, of the conjunction 
(better yet, disjunction) ‘and’. 
A. The disjunction ‘and’ 
According to François Dosse, Foucault demonstrates that the ‘fundamental question’ 
Deleuze raises is ‘that of knowing what thinking is’.51 From this fundamental question 
other important questions flow: how does Deleuze conceive of thinking? How does he 
pursue the knowledge of thought? In what way does thinking through the event and the 
phantasm characterise the particularly Deleuzian conception of thinking? I do not have 
enough space here to explore all these important questions given their scope and the mul-
tiplicity of possible answers. Nevertheless, for present purposes, let us just assume that it 
is possible to subsume all of them under the question: how, according to Foucault, does 
Deleuze’s thinking of the event and the phantasm make thinking possible again? We will 
see that, for Foucault, Deleuze awakens this possibility by identifying and elaborating 
what Foucault refers to as the ‘disjunctive affirmation’ of the event and the phantasm as 
well as of thought itself and its object.  
 
47 Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum” [1970], in Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James 
Faubion (1998), 355. 
48 Ibid., 343. 
49 Ibid., 367. 
50 Ibid., 353; Foucault’s emphasis. 
51 François Dosse, “Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship,” in Between Deleuze and Foucault, ed. 
Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel W. Smith (2016), 13. 
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 Going back to Dosse, he finishes his statement above by saying that Deleuze’s funda-
mental question allows him to situate thought within what Dosse, seemingly following 
Foucault, refers to as the ‘affirmative disjunction’ of the event and the phantasm.52 I say 
‘seemingly’ because nowhere in Foucault’s original French text, ‘Theatrum Philosophi-
cum’, can we find Dosse’s phrase, ‘affirmative disjunction’. Instead, what we can find are 
the following phrases: 1) ‘severed or disjoint affirmation’; 2) ‘to affirm disjunctively’; and, 
3) ‘affirmation by disjunction’. The first is expressed in the phrase, ‘leur double affirma-
tion disjointe, leur disjonction affirmée’,53 which is translated into English as ‘their severed 
and double affirmation, their affirmation of disjunction’.54 The second is found in the ex-
pression: ‘[Deleuze] a découvert la philosophie qui permet de les affirmer l’un et l’autre 
disjonctivement’,55 the last part of which is translated as ‘…that permits the disjunctive 
affirmation of both’.56 Finally, Foucault asserts that one of the requirements to free differ-
ence from ‘identity thinking’ is ‘une pensée affirmative dont l’instrument est la disjonc-
tion’,57 translated as ‘affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction’.58 Presumably, 
one or all of these phrases are the basis for Dosse’s translation. Admittedly, he puts his 
phrase in quotation marks, suggesting that he is merely playing with words and perhaps 
intimating that the phrase may not be what Foucault meant. It is unfortunate that he does 
not elaborate what he means by ‘affirmative disjunction’. Nevertheless, I would argue that 
there is a crucial difference between his phraseology and that of Foucault. Therefore, it is 
necessary to distinguish each of their phraseologies, because it helps to clarify how 
Deleuze, for Foucault, makes it possible to think through the event and the phantasm.  
At first glance, the two phraseologies, Foucault’s ‘disjunctive affirmation’ and Dosse’s 
‘affirmative disjunction’, sound the same. On closer inspection, however, one finds that 
there is a difference between the two. The difference is subtle but significant. In saying 
that Deleuze enables us ‘to think through the event and the phantasm’, Foucault wants to 
emphasise that the conjunction ‘and’ does not function here as a conjunction in the way 
that one normally expects, that is, connecting related words and things. In this case, it 
does not connect ‘event’ and ‘phantasm’, but rather connects them by means of disjunc-
tion or difference, hence ‘affirmation by disjunction’ or ‘disjunctive affirmation’. Foucault 
explains that, even though it is a conjunction, the term ‘and’ in the phrase ‘thinking of the 
event and the phantasm’ is disjunctive because it does not identify the event and the phan-
tasm but rather differentiates them or affirms them disjunctively. Asserting that ‘the phan-
tasm and the event [are] affirmed in disjunction’,59 Foucault emphasises the disjunctive 
function of ‘and’ by italicising it at least twice in the text. However, in being disjunctive, 
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53 Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum” [1970], in Dits et Écrits, 1954-1988, ed. Daniel Defert and 
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54 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (1998), 353. 
55 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (2001), 955. 
56 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (1998), 355. 
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58 “Theatrum Philosophicum” (1998), 358. 
59 Ibid., 353. 
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elaborates Foucault, ‘and’ nonetheless affirms both the event and the phantasm, asserting 
their truth, thereby confirming Deleuze’s view of thinking.  
The disjunctive affirmation of the event and the phantasm by means of the conjunction 
(better yet, ‘disjunction’) ‘and’ is crucial in understanding not only Foucault’s phraseology 
but also, and more importantly, Deleuze’s philosophy itself. That is why Foucault could 
not stress enough the importance of what the disjunction ‘and’ does to both ‘thought-
event’ and ‘thought-phantasm’, namely, to affirm both disjunctively. One can even make 
the case that in his review-essay Foucault focuses more on the disjunction ‘and’ or its dis-
junctive affirmation than on what Deleuze means by either ‘thought-event’ or ‘thought-
phantasm’. Consequently, it can be argued that, for him, understanding each of them is 
somewhat of less importance than understanding the disjunctive function of ‘and’. How-
ever, that can be the subject matter of a different paper. It has to be clear that I do not 
discount the importance of understanding either thought as ‘event’ or thought as ‘phan-
tasm’. All I am saying here is that understanding the role the disjunction ‘and’ plays is 
crucial because it penetrates into the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy, which, for Foucault, 
challenges and exhorts everyone to think difference itself.  
Put more clearly, understanding the disjunctive affirmation of the event and the phan-
tasm as well as the role the disjunction ‘and’ plays is important because it sheds light not 
only on thinking but also on the way it comprises what thinking is. Foucault explains that 
the disjunctive affirmation of the phantasm and the event is, for Deleuze, thinking itself. 
He writes: ‘The phantasm and the event, affirmed in disjunction, are the object of thought 
[le pensé], and thought itself [la pensée]’.60 The original French text reads: ‘Fantasme et 
événement affirmés in disjonction sont le pensé et la pensée’.61 ‘Thought’, he continues, ‘has 
to think through what forms it, and is formed out of what it thinks through’.62 Although 
the words ‘le pensé’ and ‘la pensée’ are italicised in the English translation, Foucault’s orig-
inal formulation of ‘le pensé et la pensée’ is unfortunately lost, with due respect to the trans-
lator. Not only is Foucault’s unique construction lost in translation; worse, the important 
function of the disjunction ‘and’ is also omitted. Even though it is present in the English 
translation, ‘and’ seems to function in its ordinary sense as a conjunction that connects 
‘thought’ and ‘object of thought’. As such, it does not have the same meaning as the orig-
inal phrase in French. Therefore, it is better to retain Foucault’s original construction and, 
once again, be mindful of the role the disjunction ‘and’ plays in it. 
In the phrase, ‘le pensé et la pensée’, it appears that there is a unification between thought 
and its object (i.e., the event and the phantasm). However, it should be clear by now that, 
with the disjunctive function of ‘and’, any attempt to unify the two should be dismissed. 
Foucault acknowledges the ‘danger’ of his formulation because it might mislead the 
reader into thinking that he considers Deleuze as someone who seeks to unify both 
thought and its object. The formulation, ‘le pensé et la pensée’, is quite ‘dangerous’, explains 
Foucault, because ‘it connotes equivalence’ and at the same time makes one think that the 
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object is identified with the subject.63 If one identifies the object with the subject, thinking 
of it as the subject, or vice versa, he would fall into error for failing to grasp their relation-
ship that needs to be affirmed disjunctively. By warning his readers against the false and 
erroneous identification between thought and its object, Foucault points once more to the 
important role the disjunction ‘and’ plays.  
Similar to the disjunctive affirmation it applies to the event and the phantasm, thought 
and its object (i.e., the event and the phantasm) are also affirmed disjunctively by means 
of the disjunction ‘and’. Likewise, inasmuch as the disjunction ‘and’ disjunctively affirms 
both the event and the phantasm in such a way that it asserts their truth, it performs the 
same function in ‘le pensé et la pensée’, asserting the truth of both thought and its object. 
Therefore, Foucault would say that we should pay close attention to the disjunctive func-
tion of ‘and’ in thinking of ‘the event and the phantasm’ as well as in ‘le pensé et la pensée’, 
that is, in the way thought is determined by its object and vice versa. In the disjunctive 
affirmation of ‘le pensé et la pensée’, even while they are disjunctively affirmed in the same 
manner as the event and the phantasm, there is nonetheless mutual determination or in-
ter-determination between thought and its object (i.e., the event and the phantasm): 
whereas the object is determined or thought through by thought, thought in turn is deter-
mined by its object. In other words, there is no thought without the event and the phan-
tasm as the former is determined by them and at the same time the event and the phan-
tasm would be nothing, without thought thinking them through.  
This sounds as if Deleuze reprises one of the most important insights of Kant in his 
First Critique: ‘Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without under-
standing none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without con-
cepts are blind’.64 An important question, then, can be raised at this point: in seemingly 
reprising Kant’s insight, is Deleuze ensnared by the same set of problems as the ones he 
is trying to eliminate? If it were the case that Deleuze criticises Kant precisely on account 
of the way the latter conceives of thinking; or, if he presents himself as an alternative to 
Kant by searching for what grounds real experience and not possible experience as it was 
for Kant, then in what way does Deleuze differ from Kant? Foucault’s comments on 
Deleuze in ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ are insightful in addressing these questions. Inter-
estingly enough, as we have seen, Deleuze also describes Foucault as a ‘neo-Kantian’ not 
because he blindly follows Kant but because he identifies these conditions as conditions 
of real experience.65 
As is well known, in the passage quoted above, Kant posits the unity of both sensibility 
and understanding and at the same time, more radically, he seeks to ground the unsyn-
thesised manifold or every possible experience on the synthetic activity of the subject. 
Without going into too much detail, Kant reacts against empiricist epistemology that ba-
sically argues that, because the mind is a tabula rasa, knowledge comes from experience. 
Seeking to rectify empiricism by generating his own version of the ‘Copernican 
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revolution’, Kant argues that it is not experience but the mind that serves as the condition 
for knowledge, that the former is grounded on the systematic unifications or syntheses by 
the a priori forms of sensibility (i.e., time and space), the categories of understanding and, 
ultimately, the transcendental unity of apperception or the ‘transcendental I’. Kant would 
say that only by presupposing the unity of these a priori conditions can knowledge or 
cognition be said to be possible. With this in mind, we can say that there are at least two 
ways by which Deleuze, according to Foucault, differs from Kant.  
First, reminding ourselves again of the disjunctive function of ‘and’, Deleuze disjunc-
tively affirms thought and its objects, and in so doing thinks difference itself. Therefore, 
unlike Kant, who grounds experience by presupposing the unity of the subject or the tran-
scendental ‘I’, Deleuze does not presuppose any unity nor does he seek to unify both 
thought and its object but, again, disjunctively affirms them, respecting their differences, 
so to speak. Second, Foucault would say that, unlike Kant, Deleuze does not seek to 
ground the object on the synthetic activity of the subject. In other words, he does not seek 
to ground the event and the phantasm on thought. Rather, as quoted above, thought is 
formed by the event and the phantasm or that the latter determines thought. This mutual 
determination or inter-determination between thought and its object marks the beginning 
of a new era for thinking.  
Foucault claims that, with Deleuze’s new way of thinking thought, there is once more 
another revolution, which revolutionises not only Kant’s philosophy but also the whole 
of philosophy itself precisely by thinking difference, in particular by thinking through the 
event and the phantasm. He asserts that the event and the phantasm are ‘what most ur-
gently needs thought in this century’.66 This does not mean that they have never been 
thought, but rather, they have been neglected or have not been thought thoughtfully. This 
suggests that, somewhat similar to the Heideggerian ‘oblivion of Being’, philosophy, ac-
cording to Foucault, has forgotten what it means to think through the event and the phan-
tasm. Correlatively, philosophy has forgotten what it means to think. There is, then, what 
we can refer to as the ‘forgetfulness of the event and the phantasm’ and/or ‘forgetfulness 
of thinking’ in the history of philosophy from Plato onwards. Deleuze, for Foucault, seeks 
to address this paucity in philosophy by carefully analysing the elements or conditions of 
thinking the event and the phantasm. Foucault cites three conditions constitutive not only 
of thinking through the event and the phantasm but also of thinking itself. They are as 
follows: acategorical thinking, univocity of being, and repetition of being as difference.67 
Fulfilling these conditions is what is meant to think difference. 
When these conditions above are fulfilled, explains Foucault, affirming Deleuze, dif-
ference is freed and thinking is made possible again. For the longest time, Foucault’s story 
goes, difference has been suppressed by the identity of the concept, characterisation of 
resemblance, philosophy of representation, Hegel’s dialectics and, worst of all, the condi-
tion of categories. The condition of categories is the strongest form of suppression be-
cause, as Foucault explains, the ‘categories dictate the play of affirmations and negations, 
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establish the legitimacy of resemblances within representation, and guarantee the objec-
tivity and operation of concepts’.68 That is why, if difference were to be truly liberated and 
if an attack were to be launched effectively against suppression, that would have to be 
directed against ‘categorical thinking’: ‘Difference can only be liberated through the in-
vention of an acategorical thought’.69 Having liberated difference from its conceptual, rep-
resentational, dialectical and categorical constraints, Deleuze, asserts Foucault, is the phi-
losopher of difference par excellence. Now that thinking is made possible again, the ques-
tion is, what does it mean exactly to think difference? To answer this, I would like to elab-
orate Seán Hand’s cryptic remark on Deleuze’s notion of thought.  
B. The name ‘Foucault’ and translation 
There can be no doubt that it is difficult to understand Foucault’s ‘disjunctive affirmation’, 
Deleuze’s notion of thought or, more generally, thinking difference itself. However, de-
spite being concise, Seán Hand, the translator of Foucault, is very helpful in this regard. In 
attempting to explain Deleuze’s conception of thinking as ‘thought of the phantasm and 
the event’, he remarks that it may be designated in two ways: 1) the name ‘Foucault’; and, 
2) translation.70 Hand’s twofold designation of Deleuze’s conception of thought is enig-
matic. It is unfortunate that he does not elaborate on the reasoning behind this twofold 
designation. He merely concludes the above statement and, effectively, his introduction 
to Foucault, by saying that Deleuze’s notion of thought can mean ‘translation’, which he 
describes as ‘a disjunctive affirmation, the emergence of a new form’.71 We have seen that 
Foucault in ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ uses the phrase ‘disjunctive affirmation’. It is pos-
sible that Hand follows Foucault in equating Deleuze’s notion of thought with the name 
‘Foucault’ as well as ‘translation’. However, it is difficult to establish this, because, even if 
he quotes a number of passages from Foucault’s ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’ in his intro-
duction, he does not acknowledge Foucault with his use of the phrase ‘disjunctive affir-
mation’. Nevertheless, despite not acknowledging Foucault and despite the brevity of his 
statement, we can still understand what Hand means when he says that Deleuze’s notion 
of thought can be designated by the name ‘Foucault’ and translation.  
Whereas it can be argued that, in saying that Deleuze’s notion of thought can mean 
translation, Hand, as a translator, is merely self-aggrandising. However, I do not think 
that he is so unashamedly promoting his job as a translator, much less his own work. 
Rather, he honestly seeks to provide an explanation for what Deleuze means by ‘thought 
of the phantasm and the event’. Whereas others such as James Kelly seek to develop a 
Deleuzian theory of translation,72 Hand is absolutely justified in saying that translation 
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itself is a good example of what Deleuze means by ‘thought’. For, following Foucault’s 
description of Deleuze’s conception of thought as ‘disjunctive affirmation’, any transla-
tion exemplifies such an idea. To elaborate, any translation expresses the meaning of the 
original text in another language. It is neither totally foreign to the original nor is it the 
same in toto as the latter. It is not totally foreign to the original because, even if it expresses 
the meaning of the original text in another language, it seeks to remain as faithful to the 
original as possible. Likewise, any translation is not the same in toto precisely because the 
original text is expressed in a different language, which, as Hand correctly describes, now 
emerges in a ‘new form’. It is in this sense that translation is a disjunctive affirmation.  
While it is easy to see how translation exemplifies disjunctive affirmation, it is difficult 
to understand how Deleuze’s notion of thought can be designated by the name ‘Foucault’. 
Firstly, such a name does not command knowledge of Deleuze’s notion of thought. Sec-
ondly, because there is no congruence between the name ‘Foucault’ and Deleuze’s recon-
struction of Foucault’s work in his book Foucault, it does not make one immediately un-
derstand what Deleuze means by the latter. Finally, this goes without saying that the 
name ‘Foucault’ in no way captures everything Deleuze says about Foucault’s philoso-
phy. Sufficient to debunk Hand’s claim, all these reasons are clearly explained by Foucault 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge. He argues that it is necessary to put into question pre-
established unities such as a book or oeuvre (i.e., body of work).73 The unity of a book or 
oeuvre made possible by the name of the author needs to be questioned because it is 
merely a product of an interpretative activity. Now, if the author of a book or oeuvre is 
displaced or put into question, how much more the name that (seemingly) has nothing to 
do with another person’s work? However, if by the designation Hand has in mind Fou-
cault’s understanding of Deleuze’s notion of thought as disjunctive affirmation, then he 
is absolutely correct in saying that the name ‘Foucault’ can be used to designate what 
Deleuze means by thought. The name ‘Foucault’ and translation, therefore, exemplify 
Foucault’s ‘disjunctive affirmation’ and/or how Deleuze, according to Foucault, thinks 
difference itself. 
 CONCLUSION 
As mentioned above, in his book Foucault, Deleuze points out that ‘thought’ is the only 
thing that Foucault is concerned with. He explains that Foucault’s history or problemati-
zation of thought is anchored by his tripartite investigation of knowledge, power and the 
self. We focused our attention on the ‘anchor of knowledge’ for two reasons. It not only 
illumines how Foucault, for Deleuze, is primarily concerned with thought but also, more 
importantly, shows distinctly Deleuze’s similarity with Foucault. Although he may sound 
as if he is explaining his own work, it is clear that Deleuze does consider Foucault as 
someone who makes it possible to think again precisely by thinking difference or, more 
particularly, by positing that the articulable and the visible are disjunctive. We have seen 
 
73 Archaeology of Knowledge, 25-27. 
Re-thinking Thought 
 
Foucault Studies, No. 27, 47-67.  66  
 
that it is on account of this disjunction that the two comprise strata or historical for-
mations.  
For his part, in ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, Foucault describes Deleuze as ‘a lightning 
storm’ that enables us ‘to think through the event and the phantasm’. By underscoring the 
important role of the disjunction ‘and’, Foucault considers Deleuze as someone who opens 
up again the possibility of thinking precisely by thinking difference, thereby asserting that 
Deleuze is the philosopher of difference par excellence. We have seen that Deleuze’s new 
way of thinking thought, for Foucault, revolutionises thought by considering it as a dis-
junctive affirmation. Negatively, thought as disjunctive affirmation is not conceptual, rep-
resentational, dialectical or categorical thinking. Positively, it is thinking difference, which 
is exemplified by translation and even the name ‘Foucault’ itself. 
From this, it is safe to say that Deleuze’s idea of the disjunction between the articulable 
and the visible has strong similarities with Foucault’s understanding of Deleuze’s notion 
of thought as disjunctive affirmation. In terms of disjunction, therefore, what Deleuze 
thinks about Foucault is the same as (at the same time different from) what Foucault 
thinks about Deleuze. Their understanding of each other, then, may be said to be disjunc-
tive. While there are stark differences between each of their examinations of the other’s 
work (what, how, why, and so on), both Foucault and Deleuze are one in their pursuit to 
re-thinking thought as well as in their understanding that the other re-thinks thought by 
thinking difference. This paper has articulated this important similarity between the two. 
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